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Abstract
Philosophy has been a public endeavor since its origins in ancient Greece, India, and China. However, recent
years have seen the development of a new type of public philosophy conducted by both academics and nonprofessionals. The new public philosophy manifests itself in a range of modalities, from the publication of
magazines and books for the general public to a variety of initiatives that exploit the power and flexibility of
social networks and new media. In this paper we examine the phenomenon of public philosophy in its several
facets, and investigate whether and in what sense it is itself a mix of philosophical practice and teaching. We
conclude with a number of suggestions to academic colleagues on why and how to foster further growth of
public philosophy for the benefit of society at large and of the discipline itself.

I. What is public philosophy?
The concept of “public philosophy” is at once very old and extremely recent. One can
reasonably argue that philosophy has always been “public,” at least until the onset of the
specialized professional academy in the 20th century. Socrates certainly thought of himself
as a public philosopher, and so did pretty much all his fellow travelers from the ancient
Greeks to the Early Moderns (Hume in particular comes to mind, but also Rousseau,
Nietzsche, and many others).
But in the context of current discussions, “public philosophy” refers to a heterogeneous set
of developments that have taken place over the past several years, broadly characterized by
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a conscious attempt on the part of (some) professional (usually, but not only, academic)
philosophers to engage the public at large. As we shall see below, this engagement includes
(but is not limited to) the production of series of books using popular culture as a vehicle to
introduce people to philosophical thinking, the use of a number of social networks (Twitter,
Facebook, Google+ and the like) to increase awareness of philosophical ideas, the
publication of an increasing number of magazines of philosophy aimed at the general
public, the organization of “meetups” and similar physical venues for discussing philosophy
in public, and of course blogging, where faculty and graduate students reach an increasingly
wide and sometimes surprisingly sophisticated audience to discuss timeless philosophical
issues as well as the latest in a particular sub-field’s scholarship.
As with most issues in philosophy, these developments have bred controversy. Some
academic philosophers may claim that public engagement activities distract from work more
useful to the field. We argue that any such objections are misguided. Public philosophy is a
valuable, indeed even vitally necessary, philosophical activity and should be pursued by
professional philosophers for both practical and theoretical reasons.
In what follows we briefly discuss the debate between philosophers over the utility of public
philosophy and put that debate in the context of broader concerns over the academy’s
engagement with the public (section II). We survey a broad (though non-exhaustive) array
of ways of doing public philosophy (section III), and then explore the question of whether
these are ways of doing philosophy, ways of teaching the subject, or something else entirely
(section IV). We do so from the particular standpoint of philosophers who have actually
engaged directly in all of these manifestations of public philosophy. We conclude (section
V) that public philosophy is at least as worthwhile a pursuit as other forms of philosophy
and make some recommendations about how to further nurture its growth.
II. Does philosophy need public engagement?
In a word: yes. The need for public philosophy is absolute and perhaps even dire, as we will
argue below. Nevertheless, our view has been disputed by practitioners within philosophy,
at least in part because of threats from outside the field. From the outside: non-philosophers
disparage the study of philosophy generally, and so public philosophy with it. From the
inside: a number of (fortunately, increasingly older) colleagues disparage engagement with
the public as a waste of time, or an activity of “inferior” intellectual value — as opposed to
writing yet another academic paper that will likely be read by a dozen people worldwide
and cited maybe once or twice during its shelf life.
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It is indubitable that philosophy these days suffers from a significant public relations
problem. Politicians and university administrators routinely refer to philosophy as a
“ridiculous” or, at best, useless, pursuit. 1 Surprisingly (or perhaps not), some of the most
vicious attacks on philosophy come from a closely allied discipline: science. It has been a
matter of routine in recent years for prominent scientists, especially physicists, to somewhat
unilaterally declare philosophy either useless or “dead.” To mention just two examples,
Nobel physicist Steven Weinberg dedicated an entire chapter of his book, Dreams of a Final
Theory to a rant against philosophy2 in which he, ironically, used philosophical arguments
to make his point. More recently, Stephen Hawking opened his recent book for the general
public, The Grand Design, with an excoriating dismissal of philosophy, only to proceed —
apparently blissfully unaware — to write a whole book about what is best characterized as
philosophy of cosmology. 3
There may be several explanations of this state of affairs. Broadly speaking, one may blame
pervasive anti-intellectualism (particularly in American society), although one would expect
that scientists should not suffer from this particular ill. 4 Another, more specific, cause may
be the increasing commodification of academic teaching and scholarship. 5 In considering
the utility of philosophical research, philosopher of science Philip Kitcher notes that
philosophy does not seem to produce the same tangible effects attributed to (say) scientific
research. Philosophers are embroiled in unresolved debates between internalist and
externalist theories of epistemology, or over the grounds of metaphysical emergence;
scientific research does not seem to be slowed by the philosophers’ lack of resolution, nor
does it seem likely that the scientists’ work will be improved by settlement of the
philosophical debates. 6 The effects on professional philosophy are clear: if a field is so
demonstrably useless (and doesn’t bring in large research grants), then research institutions
might as well stop encouraging its pursuit. Indeed, a number of universities have already
closed their philosophy departments and others threaten to follow suit. 7
Whether or not a pursuit is useful is, in part, an empirical question (after one has
conceptually clarified what measure of utility one is interested in and why), and the data
confirms that the study of philosophy is in fact useful. In particular, it is useful precisely by
the commoditized metrics used to judge the success of academic programs: for example,
statistically it is clear that philosophy majors can expect a higher-than-average entry-level
income after graduation. 8 Anecdotally, no less a scientific authority than Albert Einstein
thought that studying philosophy was crucial for success in science and encouraged his
colleagues to pursue it. 9 Philosophy departments routinely share these facts through
brochures and departmental websites in an effort to attract more students (and thereby stave
off threats of department closure). 10
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Nevertheless, many non-philosophers continue to believe that philosophy is a priori a waste
of time and resources. Their insistence may be indirectly encouraged by sources within
philosophy itself. We can personally attest to the disdain that some of our colleagues have
for any sort of public outreach: they argue that such efforts draw resources away from
research that may advance the field. Kitcher notes that, since disciplinary progress often
entails fragmentation and specialization, the sorts of questions that many philosophers
qualify as “centrally” important are esoteric and uninteresting to the broader public; by
contrast, philosophical questions of direct public interest are considered “peripheral” to
professional philosophy. 11 Consequently, philosophy has tended towards insularity, and
many of its practitioners see efforts to make it more accessible as antithetical to its progress.
Whether or not philosophy is demonstrably useful, there are professional philosophers who
believe that it ought only to be useful for professional philosophers, or (less harshly) that
professional philosophers ought only to engage the insular concerns of other professional
philosophers. Public philosophy seems beside these points, if not wholly opposed to them.
This is an evaluative question that is much more difficult to resolve than the empirical
question of usefulness, and so the public relations problem persists.
It is somewhat ironic that perhaps the best lesson for how to get philosophy out of its
current rut comes from science itself. It was not long ago that public advocacy of
science was perceived by most practicing scientists — especially in the US — as at best
an entirely secondary activity, pursued by colleagues who were just not good enough to
do real science. 12 Things changed palpably in the early 1990s, when the Republican
“revolutionaries” in Congress, headed by then Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich,
began making rumors to the effect that they were going to cut science funding,
especially in “sensitive” areas, such as evolutionary biology and cosmology (because
notions like evolution and the Big Bang went contrary to the religious fundamentalism
of many of their constituents). Suddenly, pretty much every American professional
science society, including the National Academy of Sciences, found it crucial to engage
in public outreach efforts. It is now easy to find prominent scientists who write for the
public without suffering any ill effect to their academic careers. Public science festivals
and other outreach events (including the increasingly popular “Darwin Day” annual
occurrence) are the order of the day.
That is precisely the sort of thing that needs to happen in philosophy — and which to some
extent is in fact happening as a result of public philosophy. The difficulties for our field,
however, are larger than those encountered by scientists: after all, the problem for scientists
was almost exclusively internally generated, an issue of convincing practitioners of various
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scientific disciplines to engage and recognize the value of public outreach. While much
specialized academic philosophy is indeed “useless” (to the broader public), this is true of
any specialized academic field, including the sciences. It would be just as difficult for a
philosopher to explain why one more commentary on Kant is good for society as it would
be for a biologist to explain why one more study on the sexual habits of an obscure species
of moth would be valuable to life on main street. But that is not what needs to be done, and
again the model of science can be usefully adopted by other disciplines. A great part of the
value of science for the general public lies in the curiosity it nurtures about the natural
world, in its respect for fact-based theorizing, and in the occasional applications with
societal impact that arise from basic scientific research. Philosophers have failed to remind
people of analogous benefits stemming from their own discipline: respect for critical
thinking, dialogue and diversity of opinion, sharpening of one’s own reasoning tools, and a
number of contributions to society ranging from the invention of logic to the articulation of
the principles of democracy. 13
But of course science per se already enjoyed an enormous social cachet. Not so philosophy,
where the battle — as we have argued — needs to be fought on both the internal front
(professional philosophers who discourage talking to the public) and the external one (the
general perception in society of philosophy as the epitome of useless pursuits).
Nevertheless, success in battles on the external front depends at least in part on winning on
the internal one, and so that will be our focus here. The first step is to recognize that
philosophy has a public image problem and it behooves the profession to look seriously in
how to address it. We now turn to some of the possibilities offered by public philosophy as
it has established itself over the past several years. These forms of outreach are ultimately as
valuable to the field as less-controversially beneficial professional activities, as we will
show, and this in turn demonstrates why professional philosophers ought to value and
engage in public outreach.
III. The (many) ways of public philosophy
There are a number of ways to practice public philosophy. We have had the opportunity to
engage in most if not all of them, so that we can write from personal experience. What
follows is a brief description of the various modalities, with their pros and cons, as a
contribution to the taxonomy of public philosophy, as well as to discussions about the
efficacy of its various forms.
Perhaps the most traditional way of doing public outreach from within any academic
discipline is through magazines and books written for the general public. However, until not
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so long ago it was hard to imagine any philosophical equivalent of Scientific American or
even Discover magazine, and pretty much the only thing a layperson interested in
philosophy could find in bookstores was yet another “History of Western Philosophy.” 14
The situation has recently changed significantly in both respects.
There is now a good number of philosophy magazines aimed at laypeople, including but not
limited to: Philosophy Now (est. 1991), The Philosophers’ Magazine (est. 1997), Think
magazine (est. 2002), Cogito (est. 2004), New Philosopher (est. 2013), and several others.
The articles in these publications tend to be short, cover a wide range of topics, and are
often (but not always) written by professional philosophers. The language is non-technical,
and the quality of the entries varies from publication to publication and even within the
same issue of a given magazine — just as in the case of the science equivalents of these
outlets, such as Discover or Scientific American.
In terms of books publishing, several houses have hit on the idea of exploiting elements of
popular culture to introduce new audiences to philosophizing. These include Blackwell’s
“And Philosophy” series, Open Court’s “Popular Culture and Philosophy” list, and the
University of Kentucky Press’ “Philosophy of Pop Culture” entries. Typically, professional
philosophers write the chapters in these books, and they range in levels of depth from
collection to collection (and, like the magazines, even within a single offering). The editors
of these series generally do a good job at picking topics that resonate with a broad audience,
and yet lend themselves as a vehicle to introduce readers to serious philosophical issues.
Our own entries in these anthologies alternately reflect the academic’s dual role as teacher
and as researcher: essays such as “Sherlock’s Reasoning Toolbox” 15 and “All for One and
One for All: Mogo, the Collective, and Biological Unity” 16 are written to explain
philosophical concepts whereas “The Limits of Scientism Sheldon Cooper Style” 17 and
“Man and Superman: What a Kryptonian Can Teach Us About Human Nature” 18 present
original philosophical arguments.
A second broad category of public philosophy is the philosophy cafe and similar initiatives.
These can take a variety of forms, from so-called Socrates Cafes to “Meetup” groups. The
basic idea is to gather interested people in a public social setting (a coffee house, public
library, restaurant, etc.) to discuss philosophical topics with the aid of a facilitator. The topic
may be set in advance by the facilitator, or even decided on the spur of the moment by
consulting the gathered participants. The quality of these interactions, again, varies as a
function of both the abilities of the facilitator and the background, interests and personalities
of the attendees. Our own experience with a Meetup group in New York City has been more
than gratifying. The group was established in 2007, has met a total of 151 times as of this
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writing, and counts a whopping 1,438 members. These numbers should go a long way
towards undermining the belief that it is difficult to interest laypeople in philosophy.
Next in our short tour of how to do public philosophy we move from concrete physical
experiences to virtual ones, particularly blogs and social networks. The “blog” (a
contraction of “web log“) is a phenomenon that emerged in the late 1990s and has since
exploded all over the internet. As a further development, since about 2009 there has been a
significant increase in the number of blogs hosting several authors. At a rough count in
early 2011 there were about 156 million public blogs in the world. In philosophy, David
Chalmers hosts a list of disciplinary blogs organized by general topic. According to
BioMetrics, the top philosophy blog is hosted by Brian Leiter from the University of
Chicago. One of us (Pigliucci) has been hosting the RationallySpeaking.org blog — devoted
mostly to science and philosophy — since 2005. To date, the blog has published 1,151
entries, has received a total of 32,649 comments, and has been visited 3,281,600 times.
Blogging is a fascinating experience, which gives professional academics (not just in
philosophy: science blogs are numerous and highly popular) a very different experience
from that of the classroom. While the quality of comments posted by readers varies
tremendously (especially if the blog host does not moderate incoming comments; host
moderation is definitely encouraged), good blogs build quality readership over time, and
some readers can seriously and knowledgeably challenge the blog writers even on
somewhat technical issues.
Finally, public philosophy may be done on social networks like Facebook, Google+,
Twitter and a number of others. The kinds of interaction, as well as the best way to
utilize these platforms, varies depending on some of the same factors briefly mentioned
for blogging, but also because of the specific features of a given social networking
platform. For instance, again writing from personal experience, Google+ and Facebook
allow prolonged, somewhat in-depth dialogues with one’s “followers,” while Twitter is
best used for rapid, shorter communications (such as pointing one’s followers to select
internet resources) rather than for actual discussions. At last check Alain de Botton (an
independent, non-academic scholar) was the top philosopher on Twitter with a
whopping 397,121 followers; Daniel Dennett and Peter Singer ranked immediately after
(respectively with 46,733 and 40,194 followers).
Regardless of the type of social networking platform (and this goes also for blogs, to some
extent), the key lies in engaging one’s audience frequently, which can, of course, be a time
consuming — if rewarding — activity. Blogs that publish less than a post per week, or
Twitter feeds that are not active almost every day, will likely lose followers, which probably
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in part at least accounts for the rising number of collaborative blogging and social
networking, as in the case of the highly visible Talking Philosophy blog and corresponding
Twitter feed. This latter example also highlights the interconnectedness of virtual platforms:
blog posts are publicized via tweets and/or Facebook and Google+ posts, and even the
“brick-and-mortar” activities mentioned at the beginning of this section (philosophy cafes,
magazines, etc.) benefit from being publicized via social networks. It is in this sense that
public philosophy does in fact draw time and resources away from insular academic
research.
Consequently, a frequent reaction from colleagues who hear about the above-mentioned
public pursuits is along the lines of, “why is anyone wasting her times doing this?,” or “that
sort of thing cheapens real philosophy,” or finally, “those are just people who want to make
money out of philosophy.” We find all three reactions downright bizarre, and more
importantly, highly deleterious to the profession.
Beginning with the third claim: it is not at all clear what exactly is wrong with professionals
benefiting financially from public outreach efforts. The days during which philosophy was a
pursuit open only to independently wealthy Athenians passed thousands of years ago,
fortunately. Our colleagues draw regular salaries from their home universities, after all, and
these salaries are in (often large) part justified by their teaching duties, and as we will see,
there is no salient difference here.
Concerning the alleged cheapening of real philosophy: it is certainly the case that public
outreach — just like teaching — requires simplifications and a less rigorous (one would
want to say more creative) approach than the one employed in the service of writing
technical papers. But this is true of all disciplines (see our comments above about the
effectiveness of science popularizing). Even so, a good number of magazine articles and
book chapters put out in the service of public philosophy are rigorous, subtle, and inventive,
as they are written by established professionals in the field.
As for why we should bother: we find it shocking that any practicing philosopher would
really need to be provided with an explicit answer, but see Section II for our take on it.
All of this does raise an interesting question about public philosophy in general, and the
forms discussed so far in particular: what is the relation of public philosophy to the subject’s
general study, and can we draw any conclusions about public philosophy’s value from that
relation?
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IV. But is it philosophy? The continuum between teaching and philosophizing
In order to determine whether or not public philosophy is a worthwhile pursuit for
philosophers, it would help first to agree on what it is that philosophers do. This entails a
definition of “philosophy,” which is a notoriously thorny issue (then again, so is the
definition of science, though the problem doesn’t seem to bother scientists themselves too
much). Nevertheless, when a journalist interested in the matter recently asked a wide range
of professional philosophers to define the field, the responses varied significantly less than
one might have imagined: almost all agreed that philosophy should be defined as a method
or practice rather than as a particular subject matter or set of concepts. 19 Most agreed that
the method involves the exposure of ideas to critical evaluation. It is for similar reasons that
John Dewey defined philosophy as a “general theory of education,” since the critical
evaluation of any field’s ideas yields progress in that field. 20
We therefore define philosophy in broad and narrow senses. Broadly speaking, philosophy
is any critical, rational reflection and discourse on conceptual connections. This is the sense
classically propounded by Aristotle and more recently endorsed by such philosophers as
Julian Baggini. 21 In this broad sense, philosophy provides the bedrock upon which other
fields of human endeavor are built, as is clear in the various “philosophies of” (e.g., science,
mind, religion, art). This “applied” philosophy is derivative of more narrow philosophical
discussion and may be pursued by philosophers and non-philosophers alike. In the narrow
sense, philosophy is the activity performed normally, if not exclusively, by professional
philosophers: critical reflection and discourse on specific, fundamental questions of human
interest that cannot be resolved empirically. These topics are generally unclaimed by other
disciplines and include issues in ethics, metaphysics, epistemology, and the like; even where
these topics may be claimed by other disciplines, they remain conceptual and not resolved
by practice within those disciplines.
Distinguishing these broad and narrow senses of philosophy has important implications for
public philosophy’s perceived and real value. Those colleagues who object to public
philosophy because of its supposed irrelevance favor the narrow sense of philosophy: if a
debate is not engaged solely by academic philosophers, or by other academics acting in the
philosopher’s role, then it is outside the narrow purview of philosophy and consequently a
distraction from “real” philosophy. But it is worth noting that the boundary between the
broad and narrow senses of philosophy is vague. As we will show below, professional
philosophers may productively engage questions outside the traditional philosophical core
and non-philosophers may productively contribute to narrowly philosophical debates. It is
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for these reasons that we assert that professional philosophers should value public
philosophy.
Consider the following taxonomy of philosophical activity. Professional philosophy
includes a number of different kinds of social interaction, each (generally) with an expected
level of philosophical discourse. We distinguish three primary forms of interaction (four
forms overall) and three levels of discourse, related to one another in this manner:
Form of Interaction
Professional Philosopher to Layperson
Professional Philosopher to
Philosophy Student

Level of Discourse
Introductory

Teacher to Undergraduate Student
Intermediate
Teacher to Graduate Student
Advanced

Professional Philosopher to Professional Academic

The forms of interaction reflect the standard academic progression common to other
disciplines as well (we could easily replace “professional philosopher” above with
“professional scientist” or any other academic). Professionals in the discipline engage in
introductory discourse with laypeople or lower-level undergraduates. As undergraduates
continue in the discipline and learn greater sophistication in the subject, the level of
discourse becomes intermediate: they understand the basics and begin to make headway
into rougher disciplinary waters, but are still finding their proverbial sea legs. This
intermediate level of discourse continues into graduate school until students complete their
coursework, after which point they are expected to have achieved a subtle, nuanced
understanding sufficient for making productive contributions to the discipline. This is
(generally) the point at which discourse becomes advanced and students come to be
considered as full colleagues.
One important point to draw out of this taxonomy is that no clear line can be drawn between
teaching philosophy and performing philosophy. Another important point is that no one

Essays Philos (2014)15:1

Pigliucci & Finkelman | 96

level of discourse correlates with any single form of interaction. These observations have
implications for the value of public philosophy.
If philosophy is, as Dewey suggested, a general theory of education, then it ought to be
difficult to distinguish between performing philosophy and merely teaching it. Nevertheless,
we might provisionally define teaching as the communication of a field’s ideas from a
relative expert in that field to a relative novice. This communication proceeds in one
direction: the novice gains additional understanding, but the expert does not. By this
standard, the professional philosopher teaches laypeople and lower-level undergraduates. As
undergraduates become more sophisticated, and as they enter graduate school, interactions
between teacher and student are still largely skewed towards the benefit of one side (i.e., the
student), but the students’ more sophisticated responses may expose the teacher’s ideas to
critical evaluation. There are therefore aspects of actual performance of philosophy in these
interactions and the interactions cannot neatly be classified as either teaching or
performance of philosophy. Finally, interactions between professional philosophers and
upper-level graduate students or other professional academics take place between peers:
both parties can expect to profit from the interaction, and the exchange of ideas proceeds
equally in both directions. This is clearly performance rather than teaching. The transition
between teaching and performance of philosophy is therefore vague.
This vagueness between philosophical teaching and performance should be expected from
the lack of correlation between interaction type and level of discourse. By the expert’s
lights, the level of discourse during teaching interactions is introductory. Advanced
discourse, as with full colleagues and upper-level graduate students, requires performance
rather than teaching. But intermediate discourse has characteristics in common with both
other levels. Interactions between professional philosophers and upper-level undergraduates
or lower-level graduate students are indisputably student-teacher interactions, but students
at this point are expected to engage in some level of performance themselves. Somewhere in
the transition from undergraduate education to graduate school, interactions gradually lose
aspects of teaching and acquire aspects of philosophical performance; this vague transitional
area is the level of intermediate discourse.
Our proposed taxonomy has implications for the claim that public philosophy is a waste of
the professional philosopher’s time. Take for granted the claim that advanced discourse is
worth the professional’s time; after all, this is the level at which professional research is
done. Professional philosophers interact with graduate students at an advanced level of
discourse; advanced discourse bridges professional-professional and professional-student
interactions. We may conclude that no one kind of interaction is the only one worth a
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professional philosopher’s attention. If advanced discourse is the level at which a
professional philosopher’s ideas are exposed to critical, rational evaluation, then we must
also admit that intermediate discourse — which includes aspects of advanced discourse, as
discussed above — is a worthwhile pursuit for the professional philosopher. The upshot is
that professional philosophers ought to engage in multiple different sorts of interactions at
multiple levels of discourse. One cannot fairly argue, then, that public philosophy is
somehow below the professional philosopher’s concern simply because it is not an
interaction between professional academics, or because it is not done at an advanced level
of discourse.
Of course, this raises the question of where in our taxonomy one should place public
philosophy. The answer, we think, is both surprising and different from, say, what one
would obtain in the sciences. If we were talking about physics, or biology, we would
probably categorize interactions with the general public as those between professionals and
laypeople, or perhaps between professionals and undergraduate students (at best). Most
members of the public do not have anything like a graduate level understanding of science,
and most importantly are in no position (valiant amateurish efforts notwithstanding) to
actually participate in the advancement of science. Even so-called “citizen scientist”
initiatives 22 necessarily limit the contribution of non-professionals to data collection and
perhaps a minimum of analysis, while the heavy duty conceptual work is done by
professional scientists.
The case of philosophy, we argue, is very different. Naturally, some laypeople will have a
grasp of narrowly philosophical concepts that is less firm than that of an undergraduate
student. But the practice of philosophy per se does not depend on expertise in any particular
subject matter, as discussed above. In the broad sense, philosophy consists in the critical,
rational evaluation of ideas; although their discipline-specific concerns define philosophy in
the narrow sense, professional philosophers can and often do engage more broadly
philosophical topics — especially when interacting with non-professionals. Since
philosophy in the broad sense is dependent on philosophy in the narrow sense, broad
philosophical discussions may cover narrowly philosophical ground, and so nonprofessionals may likewise engage narrowly philosophical topics. Our experience with
blogging, Meetups, social networking and the like has provided us with plenty of examples
of non-professionals who are very well read even in some aspects of the narrow
philosophical literature (depending on their interest), and who can argue points and further
discussions almost on a par with professional philosophers. The charge that public
philosophy is a distraction from narrowly philosophical concerns therefore fails because all
philosophy has the potential to be public philosophy.
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Similar considerations show that public philosophy is not less valuable to philosophers than
other forms of philosophy. Narrowly philosophical interactions with members of the public
include some aspects of teaching, but clearly take place at an intermediate level of discourse
(at least). In those cases, therefore, doing public philosophy is performing actual philosophy
(or close to it), and not merely teaching. If it is worth the professional philosopher’s time to
teach graduate students — another form of interaction that includes aspects of teaching and
performance — then surely it must also be worth the professional philosopher’s time to
participate in public philosophy.
We do not mean to imply that public philosophy would not be valuable to philosophers if it
did not involve at least an intermediate level of discourse. To the contrary: we would
consider public philosophy worth the effort even if it were exclusively a “mere” teaching
interaction with the general public about philosophy, although of course that is a more
difficult case to make to the skeptics. Academics often treat interactions at the introductory
level of discourse as incidental at best. One “perk” of securing a tenure-track job is
supposed to be a greater level of freedom from obligations to teach introductory-level
courses; courses at that level of discourse are increasingly left to graduate-level adjunct
instructors, few of whom are given formal training in teaching as part of their graduate
education. 23 24 Those who dismiss introductory-level teaching generally are not likely to
value introductory-level public philosophy.
This attitude has contributed to philosophy’s public relations problem. Recent research
indicates that lower-level undergraduates are more likely to pursue higher-level study in
humanities disciplines when their introductory-level courses are taught by tenured or tenuretrack faculty. 25 Empirically, then, professional philosophers — who, as noted in section I,
find their discipline under threat of extinction — would benefit from a less dismissive
attitude towards introductory-level teaching: successful introductory-level discourse makes
advanced-level discourse possible. Even if one does not adopt the view that introductorylevel teaching is valuable for its own sake (as we do), she must admit that it is valuable
towards the security of higher-level discourse. As noted above: philosophy in the broad
sense, which is more easily communicated to the layperson, depends on philosophy in the
narrow sense. Professional philosophers do value teaching philosophy in the narrow sense
to graduates and upper-level undergraduates. Since introductory instruction makes those
more valued forms of teaching possible—by securing departmental resources, by recruiting
new students, and by giving students tools for success at higher levels of discourse — it
follows that professional philosophers ought to value teaching philosophy in the broad
sense. Introductory-level interactions, including both undergraduate teaching and public
philosophy, are therefore valuable to the professional philosopher.
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Of course, some of the settings for public philosophy described in the previous section lend
themselves better than others to the performance of philosophy. Accordingly, professional
philosophers interested in having their narrowly philosophical ideas challenged from a fresh
perspective would do well to concentrate on blogging, while philosophers more inclined to
devote their time to public appreciation of philosophy, in both the broad and narrow senses,
will be more efficacious by contributing to book chapters or hosting meetups and
philosophy cafes. This brings us to the last question we would like to briefly discuss in this
paper: if public philosophy is valuable for professional philosophers, then what should be
done to further the idea of public philosophy among academic professionals?
V. What should be done about public philosophy?
We mentioned above that beginning in the 1990s a number of professional science
societies have started to take much more seriously the idea of supporting and
encouraging public outreach efforts by their members. The American Philosophical
Association, however, is definitely behind the curve on this count. While the APA
website lists resources for academics and graduate students, the focus is largely on
professional philosophy or on teaching.
Yet, even the APA has recently begun to pay attention. In 2011 it started a “Public
Philosophy Op-Ed contest” sponsored by their committee on public philosophy. That year
five entries were given the award (a not exactly impressive $100 each): James Stacey
Taylor for “Want to Save Lives? Allow Bone Marrow Donors to be Paid” (Los Angeles
Times), David Kyle Johnson for “Watson in Philosophical Jeopardy” (Psychology Today),
José-Antonio Orosco for “Tuition Bill the Decent Option” (Corvallis Gazette-Times),
Louise M. Antony for “Goodness Minus God” (New York Times), and Todd Edwin Jones
for “Budgetary Hemlock” (Boston Review). Unfortunately, as of the time of this writing
(late 2013) no additional competition has been announced, even though the web site states
that the public philosophy prizes will be given annually. Clearly, much more can (and
should, for the reasons given above) be done.
There are a number of other steps that the APA and similar societies throughout the world
(or even individual academic departments) could take in this respect. To begin with, a
dedicated section of the web site could be devoted explicitly to public philosophy to send
the message to their members that the issue is important. Perhaps the most important move
would be to advice the academic community that public outreach ought to be considered as
one of the criteria for granting tenure and/or promotion, alongside the traditional criteria of
scholarship, teaching and university service. There is no reason why this additional criterion
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cannot be quantified and standardized just like the other three are, although of course it
would take some discussion and eventual consensus on the best ways to do it. It is our
perception that the academic philosophical culture is changing anyway, with younger
colleagues increasingly involved in blogging, writing for the public, and other outreach
efforts. But it would certainly speed things up if professional societies and university
administrations would send a clear message encouraging such activities, as opposed to just
tolerating or even implicitly obstructing them.
A perhaps more ambitious, but likely vital for the profession, effort could go into
encouraging fundraising aimed at the establishment of professional chairs for the public
understanding of philosophy, analogous to the Simonyi Professorship for Public
Understanding of Science currently existing at Oxford University. One such chair actually
exists, since 2009, at the University of Warwick (UK), and is currently held by Professor
Angela Hobbs. This shows the feasibility of such endeavors, and we maintain that the
community ought to strive so that this will soon become a much more common feature of
the academic landscape.
Certainly additional initiatives can be thought of and implemented in order to make public
philosophy a standard component of what professional philosophers do, and this paper is
meant only as a partial contribution to the ongoing conversation. We would like to remind
our colleagues that public philosophy is not just good for the profession’s PR (which is
badly needed anyway!), but is a way to bring public intellectualism back to the forefront of
societal discussions concerning a broad range of issues on which philosophers can
knowledgeably comment. Moreover, let us not forget that the academy as such largely
exists because of the public purse (even private universities increasingly depend on public
research grants to thrive), and that as the beneficiaries of such contribution it is a moral
imperative for us to give something back to the public.
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